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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
The need for a “more harmonious society” was raisedfor the first time in 2002 at the Sixteenth Congressof the Communist Party of China (CPC). In 2004,
the Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee called for “the
building of a harmonious society” (Goujian shehuizhuyi hexie
shehui 构建社会主义和谐社会). During the sixth plena-
ry session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the CPC,
in October 2006, President Hu Jintao raised the building of
a “harmonious society” to a “more important position” in the
work of the Party. The idea, a “harmonious society,” is invest-
ed with a wide range of meaning, encompassing the reduction
of the gap between rich and poor, greater employment,
improvements in fairness and justice, an end to corruption, the
maintenance of public order and the protection of the environ-
ment. In March 2007, Jia Qinglin, the Chairman of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, went to
far as to rehabilitate the role of religion as a factor in promot-
ing social harmony.((1) Various senior political leaders are now
recommending to draw inspiration from Confucian, Buddhist
or Taoist wisdom in order to achieve that objective.
The present study will concentrate on the question of dispar-
ities and social and territorial fractures. It will show that the
real socioterritorial revolution that China has been experi-
encing since 1978 flatly contradicts this ideal of a “harmo-
nious society” that President Hu has placed on his agenda.
Since the policy of reforms and opening was launched in
1978, Chinese society has effectively ceased to be founded
on egalitarianism; spatial disparities are to be seen on the
same scale as in many other developing countries. In a polit-
ical system still officially claiming to be communist, the
theme of inequality has become a major issue in society: it
has reached an “alarming level,”((2) as judged by both the
authorities and public opinion. Some officials anticipate a
crisis some time after 2010 if the process is not reversed.((3)
In fact, the “process of social stratification” (shehui cengci-
hua) in post-Maoist China supplies the material for an evolv-
ing branch of research in the social sciences. Inasmuch as
the various social categories do occupy different territories,
social stratification also reflects territorial fragmentation. 
Our aim here is to draw up an inventory of this much-debat-
ed question while showing the difficulty involved in adopting
a scientific approach to these fractures and to their dynam-
ic, so varied are the present assessments and so governed by
political considerations. We shall seek to reveal the strate-
gies and the myths created by the authorities in order to play
down the existing social and spatial disparities. Our analysis
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This article offers an inventory of the social and territorial fractures in Hu Jintao’s China. It shows the unarguable
but ambiguous emergence of a middle class, the successes and failures in the battle against poverty and the
spectacular enrichment of a wealthy few. It asks whether the Confucian ideal of a “harmonious society,” which the
authorities have been promoting since the early 2000s, is compatible with a market economy. With an eye to the
future, it outlines two possible scenarios on how socioterritorial fractures in China may evolve.
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
will take two standpoints. The first, a wide-angle view, will
show the process whereby sociospatial polarisation has
intensified since 1978. The following three parts will take a
close look at the uncertain outlines and blurred identity of
the three main social categories, dealing successively with
the middle class, the poor and the rich, placing each class in
its own territory.A Dynamic of  UnprecedentedSocioterr ito rial  F ragmentation
Our aim is not to tackle in detail the vast question of social
inequality in China since 1978, but rather to show how
China has for three decades been experiencing an acceler-
ated, indeed unprecedented, process of social polarisation
and territorial fragmentation.((4) The use of the term shehui
cengcihua 社会层次化 (the process of social stratifica-
tion) in China’s scientific literature and later in official
speeches, indicates how disparities are widening in China.
The growing incidence of this form of social and spatial dis-
continuity is found at every level: between regions, within
the regions themselves, or between country people and city
dwellers. 
A Gini  coeffi ci ent  a t  the  Brazi l ian l eve l?
Many analyses refer to variations in the Gini coefficient to
show how social inequality is intensifying in China. The Gini
coefficient is one of the most commonly used indicators for
measuring social inequality. 0 corresponds to perfect equality
and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality. Like any measure-
ment tool, it has its limitations: thus, a country with an aver-
age Gini coefficient may have millions of people living in the
most extreme poverty; furthermore, it is a static measurement
tool that takes no account of the dynamic of increasing
incomes; the Gini coefficient also has the disadvantage of
being based on official income statistics. Despite these
imperfections, it does give an approximate and relatively true
picture of the level of inequity within a given society.
Before 1978, China’s Gini coefficient was very low, lower
than that of other developing countries: it was 0.16 in the
cities and 0.24 in the countryside. In most of the developing
world, the coefficients varied between 0.37 and 0.43 (cities)
and between 0.34 and 0.40 (countryside).((5) The post-
Maoist period has had three distinct phases in terms of Gini
coefficient. From 1978 to 1984, it reflected average growth
of inequality: the Gini coefficient grew slowly, rising from
0.288 in 1981 to 0.297 in 1984. Between 1985 and 1989,
however, moderate growth was accompanied by the swift
widening of inequality: the Gini coefficient increased from
0.338 to 0.444 by 1995.((6)
Over recent years, the Gini coefficient has been rising fast.
It has become a political issue of acute sensitivity, with
authorities and experts providing sharply divergent interpre-
tations. In March 2001, the Prime Minister Zhu Rongji
drew upon a survey carried out in 1999 in asserting that the
Gini coefficient was still only 0.39, that is to say “close to
international levels.” The official figure is far from reassuring
when we know that the level of 0.4 is internationally accept-
ed as a warning sign regarding social inequality.
In reality, the figures provided by China’s National Bureau
of Statistics, undoubtedly an official body, show that the 0.4
level has already been exceeded: the coefficient rose from
0.386 in 1998 to 0.458 in 2000. In fact, a few days before
Zhu Rongji’s intervention, the Xinhua news agency had put
the Gini coefficient at 0.458 and described it as “above the
international warning threshold”. Most analysts estimate that
the Gini coefficient is today around 0.5. But some studies,
such as that by He Qinglian, taking into account salaries,
additional earnings and illegal income (tax fiddles, monop-
oly payoffs), put it as high as 0.6, that is to say, at the
Brazilian level.((7) It is recalled by some that at the time when
Mao and the Communists took power in the 1920s the Gini
coefficient was around 0.5 and, making due allowance for
changing times, they establish a parallel with that explosive
social situation today.
Generali sed soc iot er r itor ia l  polar isation
Whatever the exact level of the Gini coefficient may be, the
yawning disparities are easily verifiable at every level of
Chinese society and right across Chinese territory.
The gaps between and within regions are still wide. In gener-
al terms, one can hardly fail to observe how, in China, levels
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4. Bian Yanjie, “Social Stratification and Social Mobility,” Annual Review of Sociology, vol.
28, 2002, pp. 91-116. G. Guiheux, “Les nouvelles classes sociales chinoises. Comment
penser les inégalités?” in François Godement and Sophie Boisseau du Rocher (dir.), Asie.
Entre pragmatisme et attentisme, Paris, La Documentation française, 2006, pp. 17-32.
I. Thireau, “Stratification sociale,” in T. Sanjuan et al., Dictionnaire de la Chine contem-
poraine, Paris: A. Colin, 2006. Wan Guanghua and Zhang Xiaobo, “Rising Inequality in
China,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 34, 2006, pp. 651-653.
5. Zhao Renwei, Li Shi, “Increasing Income Inequality and its Cause in China”, Journal of
Economic Research, N° 9, 1997.
6. B. Gustafsson, Li Shi, “Effects of the Transition on the Distribution of Income in China. A
Study Decomposing the Gini Coefficient for 1988 and 1999,”, Economics of Transition,
9, 2001, pp. 593-617.
7. South China Morning Post, 24 April 2001.
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of development and wealth decrease the further one moves
inwards from the coast. But this shareout is complex. When
the results of the first big national economic survey were pub-
lished in December 2005, they revealed that variations in eco-
nomic power were much more significant than earlier esti-
mates had suggested. Even in the coastal areas of China, the
economic dynamic is far from being homogeneous. The urban
regions are also clearly regarded as highly privileged areas in
China itself. The statistical revision in 2005 underscored the
importance of the service sector as a dynamic force in the
great Chinese cities. According to the latest figures, the GDP
of the Beijing municipality, 68% of it deriving from service
industries, has thus moved from fifteenth to tenth place nation-
ally, overtaking far more populous provinces such as Hubei,
Fujian, Hunan, Heilongjiang and Anhui. In terms of GDP
per capita, the most dynamic municipalities are comparable
with those in developed countries. In 2006, the Canton
municipality, an urban region of seven million people, reached
the US$10,000 threshold of the developed countries, accord-
ing to the World Bank.((8) At the other extreme, GDP per
capita in the province of Guizhou is put at US$614; the
Guizhou-Canton ratio is 1:16.
The gap between the coastal regions in south China and
those in the north has widened. The revised GDP figure for
Guangdong, the epicentre of the reforms and of openness,
reached US$380 billion in 2006 and is expected by 2008
to overtake that of Taiwan (US$323 billion in 2006).((9)
One of the main explanations for the increase in the figures
is that the output from small and medium-sized enterprises,
previously underestimated, has been evaluated more accu-
rately. Thus, the estimated gap in GDP between
Guangdong and Shandong, in first and second regional
places respectively, shot up from 55 billion yuan to 380 bil-
lion.((10) The survey revised downwards the GDP of seven
provinces, some of them populous areas in the interior
(Henan, Sichuan, Hubei). The north-east is shown to be
catching up more slowly than foreseen: Liaoning, though a
coastal area, is nevertheless one of the provinces for which
GDP was revised downwards.
Since the reforms, the gulf between town and country has
also widened considerably. In 1978, the annual per capita
income (at current prices) of urban households was 2.57
times higher than that of rural households; later, after decol-
lectivisation, the gap narrowed to 1.85 times by 1985.((11) But
this process of partial catching-up in rural living standards was
of short duration. Over recent years, the trend has clearly
been the other way. By 2001, the average per capita income
in urban households had risen to 6,859 yuan as against
2,366 yuan in rural households—a ratio of 2.9:1. By 2004,
the figures were 9,421 yuan as against 2,936 yuan, the ratio
having increased to 3.2:1. In reality, some economists put this
gulf at over 6:1 when various government subsidies—for edu-
cation, health and public services—are taken into account. 
During the Maoist period, the countryside presented a large-
ly undifferentiated picture of poverty. As in the rest of soci-
ety, disparities among rural families tended to yawn wider.
The reforms did enable a minority of peasants to enrich
themselves. Most, however, could hardly benefit from them.
Thus, the Gini coefficient among rural households doubled
between 1978 and 1995, rising from 0.21 to 0.42.((12) These
intra-rural disparities coincide in part with a spatial divide.
According to figures from 2004, rural households in 14
provinces or autonomous regions had net per capita income
averaging less than 2,500 yuan per year; all 14 provinces
were in central China or in fringe areas occupied by ethnic
minorities. Conversely, in the three urban municipalities of
eastern China and in the province of Zhejiang, peasant
incomes averaged above 5,000 yuan. The most extreme con-
trast was between peasants in the outskirts of Shanghai who
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8. Xinhua, 4 January 2007.
9. China Daily, 11 December 2006.
10. Xinhua, 13 January 2006.
11. Business Weekly, 4 December 2002.
12. Azizur Rahman Khan, C. Riskin, Inequality and Poverty in China in the Age of
Globalization, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. The National Bureau of Statistics
puts the figure lower, at 0.35 by 2000.
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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
in 2004 earned average incomes of 7,066 yuan, 4.1 times as
much as the poverty-stricken peasants of Guizhou (1,721
yuan). Because of persistent drought and the scarcity of non-
farm incomes, the countryside in the west of the country is
beset with poverty. In the year 2000, the average per capita
income was little more than half that of peasants in rural
areas in the east.
The urban population, more favoured overall, also has a
wide spread of earnings ranging from the expanding white
collar class, to low wage-earners to those at the bottom:
workers faced with unemployment, as well as the marginal
and overexploited world of the temporary migrants. Some
observers consider that the inequality of pay levels within
urban areas has become more significant than that between
town and country.((13) The assertion seems quite logical when
one considers that the urban areas, especially those of the
great cities, house the richest population groups in the coun-
try((14) alongside migrant workers living in wretched condi-
tions in dormitories or makeshift lodgings on the fringes of
the cities.
Having dealt in a generalised way with the question of social
inequalities in China, we must try to outline more accurate-
ly the main social categories as well as their recent develop-
ment. As in many branches of China studies, it is difficult to
identify or evaluate social phenomena, so masked are the
scientific questions by political considerations. Chinese soci-
ety has, since 1978, experienced shattering upheavals.
Leaving aside the rich, two social classes are today the sub-
ject of scientific and political debate:((15) the middle class and
the poor. The social and political acceptance of the phenom-
enon of the poor and the rich depends in part on how one
measures the relative importance of these two categories,
and on the ensuing discourse.The  Emergence  o f an UrbanMiddle Class ,  Uncertain Sti l land Fraught  With Problems
The present emergence of the middle class (zhongchan jieji
中产阶级) raises great hopes among Chinese leaders.
During the Sixteenth Party Congress held in 2002, Jiang
Zemin, the former General Secretary of the CPC, proposed
for the first time that the proportion of the population earn-
ing average incomes should increase. The announcement was
taken as a major political signal. This phenomenon is consid-
ered not only as indicative of the maturity of Chinese socie-
ty but also as a means of reducing social tensions and the
polarisation of rich and poor. The middle class, which is pre-
sumed to be conservative and moderate, is perceived as a
powerful force for the social economic and political stability
of the country. The term “middle class” generally refers to
the category of the population whose members can afford to
buy their own house or apartment and a car, and to take on
the expense of education and leisure. In China, it comprises
five professional categories: entrepreneurs in high technology
firms, managers in foreign multinational companies, man-
agers in the big state-owned financial institutions, senior tech-
nicians, and private businessmen. These are the favourite tar-
gets for the multinationals, who see in the middle class the
heart of the consumer market.
Nevertheless, the numerical importance of the middle class
is disputed.((16) Estimates vary noticeably, according to which
criteria are used to define it.((17) According to the criteria
applied by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS), families with assets worth between 150,000 and
300,000 yuan belong to the middle class. By that measure-
ment, in 2003, CASS estimated the class as 19% of the
total population (as against 15% in 1999). It puts its share
of urban households at 49%.((18) Looking ahead, CASS
expects the middle class to expand to a 40% share of the
total population by 2020. According to calculations by the
BNP Paribas bank, China had more than 50 million middle
class families in 2002, each with an average annual income
of 75,000 yuan and assets worth 310,000 yuan. The bank
predicts that, by 2010, the number should increase to 100
million households earning yearly average incomes of
150,000 yuan and owning assets worth 620,000 yuan. The
National Bureau of Statistics estimates the urban middle
class at 24.5 million families, about 75 million people, rep-
resenting 13% of all urban households. By 2010, the Bureau
expects that proportion to swell to 25%, corresponding to 57
million homes and to 170 million people. Looking beyond
all these differing estimates, there is a universal acceptance
that the middle class is emerging rapidly. Thus, what is tak-
ing place in China is the change from a social structure of
hierarchical and pyramidal form, with strong social polarisa-
tion at the top and bottom, to an olive-shaped structure in
which the middle class will be dominant.
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13. Worldwatch Institute, 22 August 2006, citing Shanghai Security Newspaper.
14. Cf. the chapter below on the rich and the “gated communities.”
15. The theme of “social structure” (shehui jiegou) is at the centre of this debate.
16. Zhou Xiaohong (ed.), Zhongguo zhongchan jiecheng diaocha (Survey of the Chinese
middle classes), Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2005, 411 pp.
17. China Daily, 27 October 2004.
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Socioterritorial Fractures in China: The Unachievable “Harmonious Society
Yet, some sociologists are strongly sceptical of this phenom-
enon and even see in this type of discourse a myth created
by some researchers or in the media. Li Chunling, a
researcher at CASS, has carried out with his team a survey
of 5,860 people aged from 16 to 70 in 12 provinces and
urban municipalities at the end of 2001. Defining the notion
of “middle class” on the basis of four criteria (profession,
monthly income, consumption/lifestyle and subjective iden-
tity), he puts the number of people belonging to the middle
class at only 35 million. In his view, the middle class, hav-
ing appeared only towards the end of the 1990s, could not
so soon have coalesced into a social group. He suspects
the authorities of seeking to overestimate this phenomenon
in order to mask the scale of present-day social disparities.
He suggests that their purpose in so doing is to emphasise
the effectiveness of social mobility: the more one can
demonstrate that the middle class is significant, the more
the phenomenon of the wealthy will appear socially and
politically acceptable. If the poor can attain middle class
status, it means that social mobility is functioning properly
and that it is possible to move from one class to another.
Actually, in November 2002, Time Magazine quoted a
researcher who, under cover of anonymity, reckoned at
only 5% the number of people with annual incomes
between US$2,500 and US$10,000.((19) Other
researchers, such as Song Linfei, of the Jiangsu Academy
of Social Sciences, consider that there will be no real mid-
dle class as long as the peasants continue to represent 60-
70% of the population and to earn derisory average
incomes per head of 2,622 yuan per year (that is around
220 yuan per month, the equivalent of around US$40). In
the view of the sociologist Li Peilin, China does not yet
satisfy the two main criteria for the formation of a middle
class: 50% urbanisation and a 50% contribution by service
industries to GDP (these rates today have reached 40%
and 32% respectively). Moreover, the present political sys-
tem will not allow a middle class to flourish in the fullest
sense of the term. For evidence of this, one need look no
further than the Party leaders: one minute they are appeal-
ing for the emergence of a middle class capable of backing
up the government—and the next they can hardly bring
themselves even to mention the term “middle class”.
Indeed, the People’s Republic was founded upon the abo-
lition of class distinctions. Most significantly, is the rise of
the middle class not the harbinger, sooner or later, of
democracy? Will the urban middle class not give birth, in
the longer term, to the bourgeoisie? China’s politicians
prefer to employ other terms: “white collar staff” (bailing
白领), “middle income stratum,” “middle income group,”
or just “middle stratum.”
In sum, a generally urban middle class is emerging swiftly; but
it is still only at an incipient stage of formation. In its present
state, it does not yet seem to be in a position really to chal-
lenge the social polarisation at the extremes that is at present
observable in China. The phenomenon is not without conse-
quence: it is plainly charged with political implications.A Dec lining  Rate  o f Abso lutePoverty ,  the Pers ist ence  ofRelative  Poverty  and theAppearance of  New Forms  o fPoverty
Historically, the question of poverty was considered a rural
issue. It was also claimed that the dynamic of growth would
progressively shrink this mass of poor peasants. Over a peri-
od of some years, the question of poverty has become cru-
cial in China, while the process of analysis uncovers ever
greater complexity. Whereas for around fifteen years China
has been experiencing an exceptional rate of growth, the
phenomenon of poverty is still ubiquitous. This paradox
attests the complex relationship between economic growth
and the reduction of poverty. Here again, the subject of
poverty is arousing a debate with a strong political reso-
nance. The official discourse tends to conclude that poverty
has almost disappeared: one purpose among several is to
make less publicly distasteful the extravagant wealth enjoyed
by a minority of the population.
Diffi cult i es  with r educing  pover ty
The inventory drawn up by the economist Hu Angang((20)
gives us precious insights into understanding this question
over the 1987-2002 period. He shows clearly that during
the 1980s the reforms policy adopted from 1978 onwards
did bring about a massive reduction in poverty. According to
the internationally accepted measure of poverty (US$1 per
day), China had 542 million people living in poverty in
1980. By 1990, that figure had dropped to 375 million, a fall
of 167 million in barely ten years.
The reasons behind this achievement—historically unrivalled
on this scale—are linked to the post-communist transition,
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but also to some specific and in some cases innovatory meas-
ures taken by the Chinese government. Despite the influ-
ence of economic cycles and despite a high level of inflation
at the start, economic growth was generally strong and rela-
tively continuous. Decollectivisation in the countryside (and
particularly the disbanding of the People’s Communes), the
return to family farming and the partial lifting of price con-
trols stimulated people’s energies and considerably increased
agricultural productivity. The creation of food surpluses
enabled the authorities to relaunch urbanisation after a
twenty-year administrative freeze. The massive switch of
rural labour into township and village industries, bolstered by
a boom in exports, enabled the peasants to earn non-farm
incomes. The ban on settling in the cities prevented the cre-
ation of shanty towns. The anti-poverty measures adopted by
the authorities (offering subsidies, opening up the roads,
providing water and electricity schemes for the villages) also
had their effect, sometimes a decisive one.
Since the early 1990s, by contrast, there has been a slow-
down in the rate at which poverty is declining. According to
international criteria, about 115 million people were
brought out of poverty during the 1990s. In Hu’s view, this
slowdown is explained by a fall in the quality of economic
growth: increases in per capita income and consumption
levels were well below that of per capita GDP. Similarly,
there was a fall in the contribution made by agricultural pro-
duction to GDP and in the ratio of peasant incomes to per
capita GDP. Job opportunities in rural areas became more
scarce because the enterprises in townships and villages
were no longer taking on labour—indeed, they were shed-
ding it (by eight million jobs between 1996 and 1998). The
underlying fall in the prices of agricultural products brought
about by the general application of market mechanisms had
a direct impact on peasant incomes: between 1997 and
2000, relative prices fell by 22%, causing an overall drop in
peasant earnings of over 301 billion yuan.((21)
Over the most recent period in China, the numbers affected
by the most extreme forms of poverty have edged downwards.
According to the official figures, the population living in
absolute poverty((22) (defined as earning a net yearly income
per capita of less than 688 yuan and not having enough food
to eat or clothes to wear) totalled 26.1 million in 2004. 
The rural population defined as “low income” (net yearly
income per capita of between 669 and 924 yuan) totalled
49.77 million in the same year. Thus defined, the two cate-
gories added together come to around 76 million people. Even
so, while the characteristics of poverty are less evident, the
phenomenon itself is largely under-estimated when defined in
these ways: the maximum yearly income threshold (924 yuan,
or barely 77 yuan a month) is set ridiculously low—and well
88 N o  2 0 0 7 / 3
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Extreme poverty at city outskirts
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below the international standard. According to estimates by
the World Bank, based on a threshold fixed at US$1 per day
per person, 22% of Chinese people live in poverty. If we
accept a still very low threshold of US$2 per day per person,
then nearly 58% of Chinese people might be considered
poor.((23) Other estimates are still more bleak: if we add togeth-
er all the people, peasants and city dwellers, earning less than
200 yuan a month—that is, the great majority of peasants rep-
resenting 67% of the entire population, plus 45% of all city
dwellers—one arrives at a figure of one billion people.((24) A few
figures relating to consumption levels support that picture. In
2004, yearly consumption expenditure per capita among rural
households did not exceed an average total of 2,184 yuan in
China: this works out at 182 yuan a month, or about US$40.
In Guizhou province, each peasant spent on average over the
year just 55 yuan on clothes and 47 yuan on health.
The new poor
The liberalisation of the economic system in China has even
been reflected in the appearance of new forms of poverty.((25)
Despite strong economic growth—and sometimes because of it—
poverty is extending to new population sectors and new territories,
both in the countryside and in the cities. Indeed, though the
socialist system did not provide for economic growth in the coun-
tryside, it did provide minimum living standards for the most vul-
nerable. The introduction of market mechanisms destroyed the
old collectivist system with its guaranteed public services. The
explosion of expenditure on schooling and above all on health has
thrown some families back into poverty.((26) Even worse, the indus-
trial boom has produced a scramble for building space, reflected
in massive numbers of evictions of peasants from their land: those
driven out, usually compensated at absurdly low rates, can no
longer rely on their vegetable patches to feed themselves.
Urban poverty is a new and widespread phenomenon. Thus,
one study has shown that the disposable income of nearly 60%
of city dwellers is below the national average.((27) The stability
of urban society in Maoist times was founded on security of
employment and accommodation. The liberalising of the econo-
my has led to a wave of redundancies among wage-earners; the
privatisation of accommodation has sharpened this loss of status.
Yet, the worst-off individuals are the “unofficial poor,” that is to
say, the rural migrants who have been living in “semi-legal” situ-
ations sometimes for as long as several years (in direct contradic-
tion of the term “liudong renkou,” 流动人口 or “mobile pop-
ulation” used to define them). The work done by Wang Yaping
on the poor residential areas of two high-unemployment cities,
Chongqing and Shenyang, gives an accurate portrait of the new
urban poverty.((28) In two out of five homes, not a single family
member has a job. Half of the families live each in one room,
sharing it sometimes with another family. Only one in five house-
holds has exclusive access to an indoor toilet and over 30% have
no kitchen. More than one-third of the families surveyed have
earnings below the official poverty threshold.The  Wealthy and thei rTerr itori es ,  a  Fast-Expandingbut Lit t le  Known Archipe lago
The phenomenon of the rich has developed at an unbeliev-
ably fast and spectacular rate. It represents nonetheless one of
the least expected and most troubling aspects of the socioter-
ritorial revolution that has been taking place in China for more
than 25 years. If we consider that, prior to 1978, the rich did
not exist as such (apart from a fraction of the nomenklatura),
it is appropriate to speak mainly of the “new rich.”
The new  rich,  an  i l l -defined phenomenon
There are several indicators that may help us take the measure
of the phenomenon. The concentration of wealth is one of the
most evident: in China, a survey of 54,000 families has revealed
that the richest 10% of city dwellers possessed 45% of the cities’
wealth, while the poorest 10% possessed scarcely 1%.((29) The
rapid growth in personal fortunes is also very significant. For
some years, foreign magazines such as Forbes and Euromoney
have been publishing lists of rich Chinese businessmen in order
to establish the hierarchy of the country’s richest people. And
since 1999, Rupert Hoogewerf, a young British researcher, has
been combing through extensive Chinese sources to draw up a
list of Chinese millionaires. Thus, the richest person is named as
Huang Guanyu. His fortune is put at more than US$1.3 billion.
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He made it by creating a chain of shops selling electronic prod-
ucts. Second on the list is Chen Tianqiao with US$1.15 billion,
credited with creating China’s online game industry. Number
three is Larry Yung (Larry Rong Zhijian), Chairman of the
investment company CITIC Pacific, and said to be worth
US$1.09 billion. A significant proportion of China’s richest peo-
ple owe their fortunes to the property boom.
The consumption of luxury products and the accelerating
spread of luxury boutiques (and even “global stores” like the
one opened in 2004 in Shanghai by the French group
LVMH) in the big cities are further evidence of the spec-
tacular enrichment of a fringe group within Chinese society.
A study by Morgan Stanley estimates at around 13 million
the number of people able to afford luxury goods. Within 20
to 25 years, that figure could swell to nearly 100 million.
While there are innumerable pointers to the existence of
China’s new rich, the phenomenon seems to have been neg-
lected by researchers; and the information available to us is
fragmentary. The abundant output of research into the poor
and into poverty is in striking contrast with the dearth of
material on the phenomenon of wealth—surely no less reveal-
ing in a post-communist society.((30)
There are several explanations for this anomaly. Firstly, it is true
that studying the rich is less urgent in terms of social utility and
fits uneasily into the study of development problems. The ques-
tion of the new rich underlines the contradictions of the system
of government. At a time when Deng’s catchphrase “Getting
rich is glorious” has offered political backing for the emergence
of the bourgeoisie so reviled in Maoist times, and when book-
shops are stuffed with translations of American manuals on how
to make money, the theme of the wealthy is still a sensitive one.
A survey jointly conducted by the China Youth Daily newspa-
per and the Sina.com website indicates that more than 72% of
the 10,250 people questioned ascribe the increase in inequali-
ty to the existence of a privileged group.((31) The general public
is all the less inclined to tolerate the existence of the rich when
their wealth has been acquired illegally. Bearing in mind the
scale of social disparity and public sensitivity about corruption,
the phenomenon of the rich is embarrassing and clearly difficult
to handle in official political communications.
All these reasons also explain why even the study of wealth
is still very restricted within official research centres in
social science. Within the academic community it comes up
against powerful practical, ideological and institutional con-
straints. Thus, most sociological studies adopt a macro-cen-
tred approach, or one based on quantitative indicators, usu-
ally watered down or giving only a vague picture of the phe-
nomenon of the rich in China. It is extremely rare to come
across micro and qualitative surveys,((32) because they are
too sensitive and difficult to conduct among a social group
addicted to privacy. Many provincial businessmen prefer to
live in obscurity. In recent years, a number of rich entrepre-
neurs have abruptly disappeared from the millionaire list-
ings because they were not able to be transparent as to the
origins of their wealth. Recently the Shanghai Tatler car-
ried the headline “The Invisible Billionaires.” The rich
have to bear a high level of political insecurity originating
not only in the collective memory of humiliations suffered
during the Cultural Revolution but also in the fate that
recently befell two tycoons accused—rightly or wrongly—of
tax evasion and banking fraud. Mou Qizhong was sent to
prison for life and Yang Bin was jailed for 18 years.
The gated communit ies,  islands  of  luxuryin  a pr ivate  archipelago  dispersed  a roundthe  great  ci t ies
The rich have access to territories with special morphologi-
cal attributes, functioning according to their own specific
logic. So if we combine the social approach and the spatial
approach we may show more accurately how the formation
of the social class is linked with the creation of these resi-
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Socioterritorial Fractures in China: The Unachievable “Harmonious Society
dential districts. In this context, the study of the process of
sociospatial fragmentation in China within the theme of the
gated communities is of particular interest. In terms of
methodology, the communities provide an exceptional
source of information about the effects of the processes of
transition and of globalisation in China. These luxury resi-
dential spaces, closed and guarded, are one of the most sig-
nificant end results of the riches produced by economic lib-
eralisation. The luxury villas represent an often dominant
proportion of the personal property accumulated by the rich
during these early stages of globalisation.
The gated communities are in their way the reflection of the
intense socioterritorial rearrangement that is taking place on
the mainly agricultural fringes of Chinese cities. They are
often associated with other territories functioning like so
many clubs (golf clubs, riding clubs, or private international
colleges); they resemble, not so much isolated micro-territo-
ries, but a private archipelago of residential and recreational
spaces, a real system of clubs that is increasingly shaping the
peripheries of the great Chinese cities. The area covered by
these residential complexes extending sometimes over sever-
al hundred hectares shows that the promoters have pur-
chased vast stretches of cultivated land—often very cheaply;
the result is that hundreds, even thousands, of peasants have
moved out. The villas are in general grouped together, not
contiguously but closely. While the gated communities,
taken individually, are usually quite small, their spatial con-
centration sometimes expands them into real city districts.
Furthermore, in their function as groupings of the economic
or political elite they also tend to act as significant command
centres. For that reason, the promoters describe them as
Central Villa Districts (CVDs). According to census data,
in August 2005 China had a total of 1,007 villa areas. It is
particularly difficult, perhaps impossible, to know how many
people live in these villa areas. But the total number of lux-
ury villas in Beijing is estimated at around 42,000 villas.Conclus ion
What emerges clearly is that the economic miracle is not
enough by itself to prevent socioterritorial fractures. And fur-
thermore it is itself producing new disparities. While China’s
extraordinary economic growth has undoubtedly improved
people’s overall living standards, it is also responsible for a
powerful dynamic of social stratification and territorial frag-
mentation, with unforeseeable effects upon the system of gov-
ernance. It does seem difficult precisely to measure the exact
scale of these fractures, but the authorities’ emphasis on the
need for a “harmonious society” bespeaks the urgency of the
question. In the end, is the ideal of a harmonious society com-
patible with a market economy, or with a market society?
When we come to look ahead, two positions are possible. If
we take an optimistic viewpoint, socioterritorial fractures are
only the secondary and temporary effects of the transition
and of growth, which is what economic theory predicts.
They are expected initially to intensify, then to become sta-
ble and progressively to decrease. Central government has
started to take countermeasures: abolishing farm taxes, for
example, increasing subsidies to grain producers and intro-
ducing a minimum wage for migrant workers. It is endeav-
ouring to lay the foundations of a welfare state. In such
advanced provinces as Guangdong, the authorities say they
are no longer restricting their ambitions to GDP growth but
seeking also to achieve sustainable development. Thus, the
Eleventh Five-Year Plan proposes to limit annual growth to
9% (instead of 12%) to reduce imbalances.((33)
A more sceptical, pessimistic or critical position would stress
the fact that the worsening of socioterritorial fractures will
continue inexorably and that China will remain imprisoned
by its own dualistic form of development. According to Fan
Gang, the Director of the National Economics Research
Institute and Chairman of the China Reform Foundation, it
is unlikely that inequalities will be corrected over the next
decade.((34) In the present context of export-led growth, the
competitiveness of Chinese products depends on low labour
costs. From this perspective, poverty may seem an intrinsic
part of China’s growth mode. Similarly, the increase in the
numbers of the rich is in part attributable to what one econ-
omist described as “the socialist corruption mode” (Julia
Kwong). Behind the question of fractures, far more compre-
hensive questions are being asked in relation to the very
structures of the regime: to China’s form of political gover-
nance, for instance, or to the contradictions between the
state’s official ideology and the social and economic dynam-
ic that drives the country forward. •
•Translated by Philip Liddell
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